We build a natural connection between the learning problem, co-training, and forecast elicitation without verification (related to peer-prediction) and address them simultaneously using the same information theoretic approach. 1 In co-training/multiview learning [5] the goal is to aggregate two views of data into a prediction for a latent label. We show how to optimally combine two views of data by reducing the problem to an optimization problem. Our work gives a unified and rigorous approach to the general setting.
INTRODUCTION
Co-training/multiview learning is a problem that asks to aggregate two views of data into a prediction for the latent label, and was first proposed by Blum and Mitchell [5] . Although cotraining is an important learning problem, it lacks a unified and rigorous approach to the general setting. The current paper will make an innovative connection between the co-training problem and a peer prediction style mechanism design problem: forecast elicitation without verification, and develop a unified theory for both of them via the same information theoretic approach.
We use "forecasting whether a startup company will succeed" as our running example. We have two possible sources of information for each startup: the features X A (e.g. products, business idea, target customer) of the startup; and the survey feedback X B , collected from the crowd (e.g. a survey of amateur investors). Sometimes we have access to both the sources, and sometimes we have access to only one of the sources. We want to learn how to forecast the result Y (succeed/fail) of a startup company, using both or one of the sources.
We are given a set predictor candidates {P A } (e.g. a set of hypotheses) such that each predictor candidate P A maps the features X A to a forecast for the result Y of the startup (e.g. succeed with 73% probability, fail with 27% probability). We are also given a set predictor candidates {P B } (e.g. a set of aggregation algorithms like majority vote/weighted average) such that each predictor candidate P B maps the survey feedback X B to a forecast for the result Y . Our goal is to evaluate the performance of a specific pair P A , P B . The learning problem, learning how to forecast, can be reduced to this goal since if we know how to evaluate the two candidates P A , P B 's performance, we can select the two candidates P * A , P * B which have the highest performance and use them to forecast. Given a batch of past startup data each with the features X A , the crowdsourced feedback X B , and the result Y , we can evaluate the performance of the predictors through many existing measurements (e.g. proper scoring rules, loss functions). This evaluation method is related to the supervised learning setting. However, there may be only very few data points about the startups with results Y . 2 When we only use a few labeled data points to train the predictor, the predictor will likely over-fit. Thus, we can boldly ask:
(*Learning) Can we evaluate the performance of the predictor candidates, as well as learn how to forecast the ground truth Y , without access to any data labeled with Y ? (See Figure 1 It is impossible to solve this problem without making an additional assumption on the relationship between X A , X B and Y . However, it turns out we can solve this problem with a natural assumption, conditioning on Y , X A and X B are independent. This assumption states that Y contains all common information between X A and X B (see Section 3 for more discussion).
With this assumption, a naive approach is to learn the joint distribution of X A and X B using the past data, and then solve the relationship between Y and X A , X B by some calculations, using the fact that X A and X B are independent conditioning on Y . However, this naive approach will not work if either X A or X B has very high dimension. We will address this issue using learning methods. Before we go further on the learning problem, let's consider a corresponding mechanism design problem. In the scenario where the forecasts are provided by human beings, we want to ask a mechanism design problem:
(**Mechanism design) Can we design proper instant reward schemes to incentivize high quality forecast for Y without instant access to Y ? (See Figure 2) People will obtain instant payments from instant reward schemes. If we do not require the reward schemes to be instant, proper scoring rules will work by rewarding people in the future after Y is revealed. It turns out the above learning problem (*) and mechanism design problem (**) are essentially the same, since there is a natural correspondence between an evaluation of their performance and their rewards. The mechanism design applications still require the conditional independent assumption. To address the two problems, a first try would be rewarding the predictors according to their "agreement", since high quality predictors should have a lot of agreement with each other. However, if we train the predictors based on this criterion, then the output of the 2 For example, if we focus on cryptographic or self-driving currencies, there are very few startups labeled with results. training process will be two meaningless constant predictors which perfectly agree with each other (e.g. always forecast 100% success). We call this problem the "naive agreement" issue. Note that the mechanism design problem (**) is closely related to the peer prediction literature, incentivizing high quality information reports without verification. It is natural to leverage the techniques and insights from peer prediction to address problems (*) and (**). In fact, the peer prediction literature provides an information theoretic idea to address the "naive agreement" issue, that is, replacing "agreement" by mutual information. In the current paper, we will show that with a natural assumption, conditioning on Y , X A , and X B are independent, we can address problem (*) and (**) simultaneously via rewarding the predictors the mutual information between them and using the predictors' reward as the evaluation of their performance.
Our contribution. We build a natural connection between mechanism design and machine learning by simultaneously addressing a learning problem and a mechanism design problem in the context where ground truth is unknown, via the same information theoretic approach.
Learning We focus on the co-training problem [5] : learning how to forecast Y using two sources of information X A and X B , without access to any data labeled with ground truth Y (Section 3). By making a typical assumption in the co-training literature, conditioning on Y , X A and X B are independent, we reduce the learning problem to an optimization problem max P A , P B MIG f (P A , P B ) such that solving the learning problem is equivalent to picking the P * A , P * B that maximize MIG f (P A , P B ), i.e., the f -mutual information gain between P A and P B (Section 4). Formally, we define the Bayesian posterior predictor as the predictor that maps any input information X = x to its Bayesian posterior forecast for Y = y, i.e., Pr (Y = y|X = x). Then when both P A , P B are Bayesian posterior predictors, MIG f (P A , P B ) is maximized and the maximal value is the f -mutual information between X A and X B . With an additional mild restriction on the prior, MIG f (P A , P B ) is maximized if and only if both P A , P B are permuted versions of the Bayesian posterior predictor. As is typical in related literature, we do not investigate the computation complexity or data requirement of the learning problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first optimization goal in the co-training literature that guarantees that the maximizer corresponds to the Bayesian posterior predictor, without any additional assumption. Thus, our method optimally aggregates the two sources of information.
Mechanism design Consider the scenario where we elicit forecasts for ground truth Y from agents and pay agents immediately. Without access to Y , given the prior on the distribution of Y , i.e., Pr [Y ], 3 by assuming agents' private information are independent conditioning on Y , in the single-task setting (there is only a single forecasting task), we design a strictly truthful mechanism, the common ground mechanism, where truth-telling is a strict equilibrium (Section 5.2); in the multi-task (there are at least two a priori similar forecasting tasks) setting, we design a family of focal mechanisms, the multi-task common ground mechanism MCG(f )s, where the truth-telling equilibrium pays better than any other strategy profile and strictly higher than any non-permutation strategy profile (Section 5.1).
Technical contribution. Our main technical ingredient is a novel performance measurement, the f -mutual information gain, which is an unbiased estimator of the f -mutual information. To give a flavor of this measurement, we give an informal presentation here: both P A and P B are assigned a batch of forecasting tasks, the f -mutual information gain between P A and P B is The agreements between P A 's forecast and P B 's forecast for the same task − f ⋆ (The agreements between P A 's forecast and P B 's forecast for different tasks) To calculate the f -mutual information gain between them, we pick a task (e.g. Task no. 2) uniformly at random and calculate the "agreement" a s between P A and P B 's forecasts for this task; we also pick a pair of distinct tasks (i, j) uniformly at random (e.g. (Task no. 1, Task no. 2)) and calculate the "agreement" a d between P A 's forecast for task i and P B 's forecast for this task j. The f -mutual information gain is then a s − f ⋆ (a d ). The formal definition (Section 4.1) actually uses the empirical expectations of a s and f ⋆ (a d ).
where f ⋆ is the conjugate of the convex function f . With this measurement, two agreeing constant predictors have small gain since their outputs have large agreements for both the same task and different tasks. The formal definition will be introduced in Section 4.1 and the agreement measure is introduced in Definition 4.2.
The f -mutual information gain is conceptually similar to the correlation payment scheme proposed by Dasgupta and Ghosh [10] (in the binary choice setting), and Shnayder et al. [33] (in the multiple choice setting), which pays agents "the agreement for the same task minus the agreement for the distinct task". In Dasgupta and Ghosh [10] and Shnayder et al. [33] , the payment scheme is designed for discrete signals and the measure of agreements is a simple indicator function. Kong and Schoenebeck [17] show that this correlation payment is related to a special f -mutual information. Thus, the f -mutual information gain can be seen as an extension of the correlation payment scheme that works for forecast reports.
Applications
In our startup running example, we consider the situation where one source of information is the features and another source of information is the crowdsourced feedback. In fact, our results apply to all kinds of information sources. For example, we can make both sources features or crowdsourced feedback. Different setups for the information sources and predictor candidates can bring different applications of our results.
Let's consider the "learning with noisy labels" problem where the labels in the training data are a noisy version of the ground truth labels Y and the noise is independent. We can map this problem into our framework by letting X B be the noisy label of features X A . That is, X B is a noisy version of Y . Our framework guarantees that the Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts Y using X A must be part of a maximizer of the optimization problem. However, there are many other maximizers. For example, since X A and X B are independent conditioning X B . The Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts X B using X A is also part of a maximizer, since the scenario Y = X B also satisfies the conditional independence assumption. If X B has much higher dimension than Y , we do not have this issue. But X B has the same signal space with Y in the learning with noisy label problem. Thus, it's impossible to eliminate other maximizers without any side information here. With some side information (e.g. a candidate set F , like linear regressions, that only contains our desired maximizer.), it's possible to obtain the Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts Y using X A . Note that our framework does not require a pre-estimation on the transition probability that transits the ground truth label Y to the noisy ground truth label X B , since our framework has this transition probability, which corresponds to the predictor P B , as parameters as well and learns the correct forecaster P A and the transition probability P B simultaneously. Ratner et al. [29] propose a method to collect massive labels by asking the crowds to write heuristics to label the instances. Each instance is associated with many noisy labels outputted by the heuristics. In their setting, the crowds use a different source of information from the learning algorithm (e.g. the learning algorithm uses the biology description of the genes and the crowds use the scientific papers about the gene). Thus, the conditional independence assumption is natural here and we can map this setting's training problem into our framework. Ratner et al. [29] preprocess the collected labels to approximate ground truth by assuming a particular information structure model on the crowds. Our framework is model-free and does not need to preprocess the collected labels since we can learn the best forecaster (predictor P A ) and the best processing/aggregation algorithm (predictor P B ) simultaneously.
Moreover, since the highest evaluation value of the predictors P A , P B is the f -mutual information between X A and X B , our results provide a method to calculate the f -mutual information between any two sources of information X A , X B of any format. Kong and Schoenebeck [17] propose a framework for designing information elicitation mechanisms that reward truth-telling by paying each agent the f -mutual information between her report and her peers' report. Thus, the f -mutual information gain method can be combined with this framework to design information elicitation mechanisms when the information has a complicated format.
Related work
Learning. Co-training/multiview learning was first proposed by Blum and Mitchell [5] and explored by many works (e.g. Collins and Singer [7] , Dasgupta et al. [11] ). Li et al. [19] , Xu et al. [37] give surveys on this literature. Although co-training is an important learning problem, it lacks a unified theory and a solid theoretic guarantee for the general model. Most traditional co-training methods require additional restrictions on the hypothesis space (e.g. weakly good hypotheses) to address the "naive agreement" issue and fail to deal with soft hypotheses. Soft hypotheses output a continuous signal (as opposed to hard hypothesis which output a discrete signal) and are typically required to fully aggregate the information from two sources. Becker [3] deals with a feature learning problem which is very similar to the co-training problem. Becker [3] seeks to maximize the Shannon mutual information between the output of two functions. However, their work only considers hard (not soft) hypotheses and lacks a solid theoretic analysis for the maximizer. Kakade and Foster [15] consider the multi-view regression and maximize the correlation between the two hypotheses. Their method captures the "mutual information" idea (in fact, correlation is a special f -mutual information [17] ) but their model has a very specific set up and the analysis cannot be extended to other co-training problems. In contrast, we propose a simple, powerful and general information theoretic framework, fmutual information gain, that has a solid theoretic guarantee, works for soft hypothesis and addresses the "naive agreement" issue without any additional assumption.
Natarajan et al. [24] , Sukhbaatar and Fergus [34] and many other works (e.g. [16, 32] ) consider the learning with noisy labels problem. Natarajan et al. [24] consider binary labels and calibrate the original loss function such that the Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts ground truth Y is a maximizer of the calibrated loss. Sukhbaatar and Fergus [34] extend this work to the multiclass setting. These works require additional estimation steps to learn the transition probability that transits the ground truth labels to the noisy labels and fix this transition probability in their calibration step. In contrast, by mapping this problem into our framework (Section 1.1), we do not need the additional estimation steps to make the calibrated forecaster part of a maximizer of our optimization problem, and can incorporate any kind of side information to learn the calibrated forecaster and true transition probability simultaneously.
Moreover, our results can handle more complicated setting where each instance is labeled by multiple labels. Rather than preprocessing the labels by a particular algorithm (e.g. majority vote, weighted average, spectral method) and assuming some information structure model among the crowds [29] , our framework is model-free and can learn the best calibrated forecaster (predictor P A ) and the best processing algorithm (predictor P B ) simultaneously.
Raykar et al. [30] also jointly learn the calibrated forecaster and the distribution over the crowdsourced feedback and ground truth labels. Raykar et al. [30] uses the maximum likelihood estimator and assumes a simple generative model for the distribution over the crowdsourced feedback and the ground truth labels, which is conditioning the ground truth label, the crowdsourced feedback is drawn from a binomial distribution, while our framework is model-free.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [14] combine game theory and learning theory to make innovative progress. We also combine game theory and learning theory by proposing a peer prediction game between two predictors. The game in GAN is a zero-sum competitive game while the game in the current paper is collaborative.
Several learning problems (e.g. finding the pose of an object in an image [4] , blind source separation [6] ) use mutual information maximization (infomax) as their optimization goal. Some of these problems require data labeled with ground truth and some of them have a very different problem set up than our work.
We borrow the techniques about the duality of f -divergence from Nguyen et al. [25, 26] . Nguyen et al. [25] show a correspondence between the f -divergence and the surrogate loss in the binary supervised learning setting and Nguyen et al. [26] propose a way to estimate the f -divergence between two high dimensional random variables. We apply the duality of f -divergence to an unsupervised learning problem and not restricted to the binary setting.
We also differ from the crowdsourcing literature that infers ground truth answers from agents' reports (e.g. [38] ) in the sense that their agents' reports are a simple choice (e.g. A, B, C, D) while in our setting, the report can come from a space larger than the space of ground truth answers, perhaps even a very high dimensional vector.
Mechanism design. Our mechanism design setting differ from the traditional peer prediction literature (e.g. [10, 17, 23, 28, 33] ) since we are eliciting forecast rather than a simple signal. We can discretize the forecast report and apply the traditional peer prediction literature results. However, this will only provide approximated truthfulness and fail to design focal mechanisms which pay truth-telling strictly better than any other non-permutation equilibrium since the forecast is discretized, while our mechanisms are focal for ≥2 tasks setting. Witkowski et al. [36] consider the forecast elicitation situation and assume that they have an unbiased estimator of the optimal forecast while we assume an additional conditional independence assumption but do not need the unbiased estimator.
Liu and Chen [20, 21] connect mechanism design with learning by using the learning methods to design peer prediction mechanisms. In the setting where several agents are asked to label a batch of instances, Liu and Chen [20] design a peer prediction mechanism where each agent is paid according to her answer and a reference answer generated by a classification algorithm using other agents' reports. Liu and Chen [21] also use surrogate loss functions as tools to develop a multi-task mechanism that achieves truthful elicitation in dominant strategy when the mechanism designer only has access to agents' reports. Instead of using learning methods to design the peer prediction mechanisms, our work uses peer prediction mechanism design techniques to address a learning problem. Moreover, our mechanism design problem has a very different set up from Liu and Chen [20, 21] . Agarwal and Agarwal [1] connect learning theory with information elicitation by showing the equivalence between the calibrated surrogate losses in supervised learning and the elicitation of certain properties of the underlying conditional label distribution. Both our learning problem and mechanism design problem have a very different set up from theirs.
Independent work. Like the current paper, McAllester [22] also uses Shannon mutual information to propose an information theoretic training objective that can deal with soft hypotheses/classifiers. However, the optimization functions from these two works are different. We also use a more general information measure, f -mutual information, which has Shannon mutual information as a special case, and provide a formal analysis for this general framework. Additionally, we propose an innovative connection between co-training and peer prediction.
PRELIMINARIES
Given a finite set [N ] := {1, 2, ..., N }, for any function ϕ : [N ] → R, we use (ϕ(y)) y ∈[N ] to represent the vector (ϕ(1), ϕ(2), ..., ϕ(N )) ∈ R N . Given a finite set Σ, ∆ Σ is the set of all distributions over Σ.
2.1 f -divergence and Fenchel's duality f -divergence [2, 9] . f -divergence D f : ∆ Σ ×∆ Σ → R is a non-symmetric measure of the difference between distribution p ∈ ∆ Σ and distribution q ∈ ∆ Σ and is defined to be
where f : R → R is a convex function and f (1) = 0.
Here we introduce two f -divergences in common use: KL divergence, and Total Variance Distance. [31] ). Given any function f : R → R, we define its convex conjugate f ⋆ as a function that also maps R to R such that [25, 26] ).
where G is a set of functions that maps Σ to R. The equality holds if and only if u(σ ) = u * (σ ) ∈ ∂ f ( p(σ ) q(σ ) ), i.e., the subdifferential of f on value
We call (u * , f ⋆ (u * )) a pair of best disinguishers. This dual version of f -divergence is introduced by Nguyen et al. [25] and also plays a key role in the design of a type of generative adversarial networks, f -GANs [27] .
f -mutual information
Given two random variables X , Y whose realization space are Σ X and Σ Y , let U X,Y and V X,Y be two probability measures where U X,Y is the joint distribution of (X , Y ) and V X,Y is the product of the marginal distributions of X and Y . Formally, for every pair of (
If U X,Y is very different from V X,Y , the mutual information between X and Y should be high since knowing X changes the belief for Y a lot. If U X,Y equals to V X,Y , the mutual information between X and Y should be zero since X is independent with Y . Intuitively, the "distance" between U X,Y and V X,Y represents the mutual information between them.
Definition 2.5 (f -mutual information [17] ). The f -mutual information between X and Y is defined as
where D f is f -divergence. f -mutual information is always non-negative [17] .
f -mutual information is used in the peer prediction literature since if the information is measured by f -mutual information, any "data processing" on either of the random variables will decrease the amount of information crossing them. Thus, in peer prediction, if we pay agents according to the f -mutual information between her information and her peers' information, agents will be incentivized to report all information to maximize their payments 4 .
Two examples of f -mutual information are Shannon mutual information [8] (Choosing fdivergence as KL divergence) and MI tvd (X ;
We define K(X = x, Y = y) as the ratio between U X,Y (x, y) and V X,Y (x, y), i.e.,
. K(X = x, Y = y) represents the "pointwise mutual information(PMI)" between X = x and Y = y. Lemma 2.4 directly implies:
where G is a set of functions that maps Σ X × Σ Y to R. The equality holds if and only if u(x, y) = u * (x, y) ∈ ∂ f (K(X = x, Y = y)).
f -divergence
Total Variation Distance |t − 1| sign(log K(x, y)) sign(log K(x, y))
K(x, y) − 1 Table 1 . Reference for common f -divergences and corresponding pairs of best distinguishers (u * (x, y), f ⋆ (u * (x, y)) of f -mutual information. K(x, y) = K(X = x, Y = y) (PMI).
Proper scoring rules
A scoring rule PS : Σ × ∆ Σ → R [13, 35] takes in a signal σ ∈ Σ and a distribution over signals p ∈ ∆ Σ and outputs a real number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever the first input is drawn from a distribution p, then p will maximize the expectation of PS over all possible inputs in ∆ Σ to the second coordinate. A scoring rule is called strictly proper if this maximum is unique. We will assume throughout that the scoring rules we use are strictly proper. Slightly abusing notation, we can extend a scoring rule to be PS : ∆ Σ × ∆ Σ → R by simply taking PS(p, q) = E σ ←p (σ , q). We note that this means that any proper scoring rule is linear in the first term.
Example 2.7 (Log Scoring Rule [13, 35] ). Fix an outcome space Σ for a signal σ . Let q ∈ ∆ Σ be a reported distribution. The Logarithmic Scoring Rule maps a signal and reported distribution to a payoff as follows:
LSR(σ , q) = log(q(σ )).
Let the signal σ be drawn from some random process with distribution p ∈ ∆ Σ . Then the expected payoff of the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
This value will be maximized if and only if q = p.
Property of the pointwise mutual information
We will introduce a simple property of the pointwise mutual information that we will use multiple times in the future. In addition to several different formats of the pointwise mutual information (e.g. joint distribution/product of the marginal distributions, posterior/prior), if there exists a latent random variable Y such that random variable X A and random variable X B are independent conditioning on Y , we can also represent the pointwise mutual information between X A and X B by the "agreement" between the "relationship" between X A and Y , and the "relationship" between X B and Y . Claim 2.8. When random variables X A , X B are independent conditioning on Y ,
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We defer the proof to the full version.
GENERAL MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Let X A , X B , Y be three random variables and we define prior Q as the joint distribution over X A , X B , Y . We want to forecast the ground truth Y whose realization is a signal in a finite set Σ. X A , X B are two sources of information that are related to Y . X A 's realization is a signal in a finite set Σ A . X B 's realization is a signal in a finite set Σ B . We may have access to both of the realizations of X A and X B or only one of them. Thus, we need to learn the relationship between X A , X B and Y to forecast Y . It's impossible to learn by only accessing the samples of X A , X B without additional assumption. We make the following conditional independence assumption: Assumption 3.1 (Conditional independence). We assume that conditioning on Y , X A , and X B are independent.
Intuitively, Y can be seen as the "intersection" between X A and X B . To better understand this assumption and its limitations we return to our running example where the variable Y is the success of a start-up. In this case, if both X A and X B contain the sex of the CEO (which we assume is independent of Y ), then this assumption will not hold. To make it hold, either Y would need to be redefined to contain the sex of the CEO, or this information would need to be removed from either X A or X B . For the mechanism design application, if the assumption is violated, for example both agents are sexists and forecast using the sex of the CEO, then it is impossible to avoid paying them for this useless/harmful information.
Well-defined and stable prior
We call Z a solution if conditioning on Z , X A , and X B are independent. Y is a solution. However, there are a lot of solutions. For example, conditioning on X A or X B , X A and X B are independent, which means X A and X B are both solutions. Thus, we have an additional restriction on the prior: well-defined prior and stable prior.
We will need restrictions on the prior when we analyze the strictness of our learning algorithm/mechanism. Readers can skip this section without losing the core idea of our results.
To infer the relationship between Y and X A , X B with only samples of X A , X B , we cannot do better than to just solve the system of equations (1), given the joint distribution over X A , X B : Q. Our goal is to obtain the Bayesian posterior predictor. Thus, we list a system that the Bayesian posterior predictor satisfies. The system below equations involve variables {a
is a solution and we call it the desired solution.
Claim 2.8 shows the above system has the desired solution.
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Note that any permutation of a solution is still a valid solution 5 . Since we cannot do better than to solve the above system, if the above system only has one "unique" solution, in the sense that any two solutions are permuted version of each other, we call the prior Q a well-defined prior. Formally,
, r ′ of the system of equations (1), there exists a permutation π : Σ → Σ such that r = π r ′ for any
The well-defined prior exist since intuitively, if |Σ A | and |Σ B | are high and |Σ| is low, it is likely Y is the "unique intersection" since the number of constraints of the system will be much greater than the number of variables.
We say a prior is stable if fixing part of the desired solution of the system (1), in order to make it still a solution of the system, other parts of the desired solution should also be fixed.
We require stable priors when we design strictly truthful mechanisms.
Predictors
This section gives the definition of predictors. We have two sets of samples
A predictor P A : Σ A → ∆ Σ for X A maps x A ∈ Σ to a forecast P A (x A ) for ground truth Y . We similarly define the predictors for X B . We define the Bayesian posterior predictor as the predictor that maps any input information X = x to its Bayesian posterior forecast for Y = y, i.e., Pr (Y = y|X = x).
With the conditional independence assumption, we have
is the pointwise mutual information.)
When we have access to both the sources where X A = x A and X B = x B , given the prior of the ground truth Y , we can construct an aggregated forecast for Y = y using P A , P B :
In this case, if both P A and P B are the Bayesian posterior predictor, the aggregated forecast is the Bayesian posterior predictor as well. Thus, it's sufficient to only train P A and P B . In the rest sections, we will show how to train P A and P B (Section 4), given the two sets of samples S A and S B , as well as how to incentivize high quality predictors from the crowds (Section 5).
CO-TRAINING: FINDING THE COMMON GROUND TRUTH
We have a set of candidates H A for the predictor for X A and a set of candidates H B for the predictor for X B . We sometimes call each predictor candidate a hypothesis. Given the two sets of samples
, our goal is to figure out the best hypothesis in H A and the best hypothesis in H B simultaneously. Thus, we need to design proper "loss function" such that the best hypotheses minimize the loss. In fact, we will show how to design a proper "reward function" such that the best hypotheses maximize the reward.
f -mutual information gain
f -mutual information gain MIG f (R) (Figure 3 ).
Hypothesis We are given H
the set of hypotheses/predictor candidates for X A and X B , respectively. Gain Given reward function R :
for each ℓ ∈ L A ∩ L B , reward "the amount of agreement" between the two predictor candidates' predictions for task ℓ, i.e.,
, punish both predictor candidates "the amount of agreement" between their predictions for a pair of distinct tasks (ℓ A , ℓ B ), i.e.,
).
The f -mutual information gain MIG f (R) that is corresponding to the reward function R is 
The maximum is MI f (X A ; X B ).
The results follow from Lemma 2.6. □
Although any reward function corresponds to an f -mutual information gain function, we need to properly design the reward function R such that, fixing R, there exist hypotheses to maximize the corresponding f -mutual information gain MIG f (R) to the f -mutual information between the two sources. We will use the intuition from Lemma 4.1 to design such reward functions R in the next section.
Maximizing the f -mutual information gain
In this section, we will construct a special reward function R f and then show that the maximizers of the corresponding f -mutual information gain MIG f (R f ) are the Bayesian posterior predictors. 
With this definition of the reward function, fixing p ∈ ∆ Σ which can be seen as the prior over Y , the "amount of agreement" between two predictions p 1 , p 2 are an increasing function д of
which is intuitive and reasonable. The increasing function д is the derivative of the convex function f . By carefully choosing convex function f , we can use any increasing function д here.
Theorem 4.3. With the conditional independent assumption on X A , X B , Y , given the samples S A , S B , given a convex function f , we define the optimization goal as the expected f -mutual information gain with reward function R f , i.e., The above theorem neither investigates computation complexity (which may be affected by the choice of f ), data requirements, nor the choice of the hypothesis class for practical implementation (see Section 6 for more discussion). 6 Given the prior over Y , we can fix p as the prior over Y . Without knowing the prior over Y , p becomes a variable of the optimization goal and helps us learn the prior over Y . 7 Recall that we use (ϕ(y)) y ∈[N ] to represent the vector (ϕ(1), ϕ(2), ..., ϕ(N )) ∈ R N . 
(1) Solution→Maximizer: For any solution Z , we can construct
Thus, based on Lemma 4.1, any solution Z corresponds to a maximizer of the optimization goal.
(2)Maximizer→(Permuted) Ground truth: For any maximizer (h * A (·), h * B (·), p * ) of the optimization goal, when f is differentiable, Lemma 4.1 shows that
is actually the solution of the system (1) . When the prior is well-defined, there exists a permutation π such that
and p * = Pr[π (Y ) = y] y where Y is the ground truth. □
FORECAST ELICITATION WITHOUT VERIFICATION
This section considers the setting where the forecasts are provided by the crowds and we want to incentivize high quality forecast by providing an instant reward without instant access to the ground truth. There is a forecasting task. Alice and Bob have private information X A , X B = x A ∈ Σ A , x B ∈ Σ B correspondingly and are asked to forecast the ground truth Y = y. We denote (
Alice and Bob are asked to report their Bayesian forecast p x A , p x B . We denote their actual reports byp x A andp x B . Without access to the realization of Y , we want to incentivize both Alice and Bob play truth-telling strategies, i.e., honestly reporting their forecast p x A , p x B for Y .
We define the strategy of Alice as a mapping s A from x A (private signal) to a probability distribution over the space of all possible forecast for random variable Y . Analogously, we define Bob's strategy s B . Note that essentially each (possibly mixed) strategy s A can be seen as a (possibly random) predictor P A where P A (x A ) is a random forecast drawn from distribution s A (x A ). In particular, the truthful strategy corresponds to the Bayesian posterior predictor.
We say agents play a permutation strategy profile if there exists permutation π : Σ → Σ such that each agent always reports π p given her truthful report is p. Note that without any side information about Y , we cannot distinguish the scenario where agents are honest and the scenario where agents play a permutation strategy profile. Thus, it is too much to ask truth-telling to be strictly better than any other strategy profile. The focal property defined in the following paragraph is the optimal property we can obtain.
Mechanism Design Goals.
(Strictly) Truthful Mechanism M is (strictly) truthful if truth-telling is a (strict) equilibrium. Focal Mechanism M is focal if it is strictly truthful and each agent's expected payment is maximized if agents tell the truth; moreover, when agents play a non-permutation strategy profile, each agent's expected payment is strictly less. We consider two settings: Multi-task Each agent is assigned several independent a priori similar forecasting tasks in a random order and is asked to report her forecast for each task. Single-task All agents are asked to report their forecast for the same single task.
In the single-task setting, it's impossible to design focal mechanisms since agents can collaborate to pick an arbitrary y * ∈ Σ and pretend that they know Y = y * . However, we will show we can design strictly truthful mechanism in the single-task setting. In the multi-task setting, since agents may be assigned different tasks and the tasks show in random order, they cannot collaborate to pick an arbitrary y * ∈ Σ for each task. In fact, we will show if the number of tasks is greater or equal to 2, we can design a family of focal mechanisms.
Achieving the focal goal in the multi-task setting is very similar to what we did in finding the common ground truth. Note that in the forecast elicitation problem, incentivizing a truthful strategy is equivalent to incentivizing the Bayesian posterior predictor. Thus, we can directly use the f -mutual information gain as the reward in the multi-task setting. Achieving the strictly truthful goal in the single-task setting is more tricky and we will return to it later.
Multi-task: focal forecast elicitation without verification
We assume Alice is assigned tasks set L A and Bob is assigned tasks set L B . For each task ℓ, Alice's private information is x ℓ A and Bob's private information is x ℓ B . The ground truth of this task is y ℓ . Multi-task common ground mechanism MCG(f ). Given the prior distribution over Y , a convex and differentiable function f whose convex conjugate is f ⋆ , Report for each task ℓ ∈ L A , Alice is asked to report p x A ℓ := (Pr[Y = y|x ℓ A ]) y ; for each task ℓ ∈ L B , Bob is asked to report p x B ℓ := (Pr[Y = y|x ℓ B ]) y . We denote their actual reports bŷ p ℓ
x A ℓ andp ℓ x B ℓ . Payment For each ℓ ∈ L A ∩ L B , reward both Alice and Bob "the amount of agreement" between their forecast in task ℓ, i.e.,
punish both Alice and Bob "the amount of agreement" between their forecast in distinct tasks (ℓ A , ℓ B ), i.e.,
In total, both Alice and Bob are paid
We do not want agents to collaborate with each other based on the index of the task or other information in addition to the private information. Thus, we make the following assumption to guarantee the index of the task is meaningless for all agents.
Assumption 5.1 (A priori similar and random order). For each task ℓ, fresh i.i.d. realizations of (X A , X B , Y ) = (x ℓ A , x ℓ B , y ℓ ) are generated. All tasks appear in a random order, independently drawn for each agent.
Theorem 5.2. With the conditional independence assumption, and a priori similar and random order assumption, when the prior Q is stable and well-defined, given the prior distribution over the Y , given a differential convex function f whose derivative f ′ is invertible, if max{|L A |, |L B |} ≥ 2, then MCG(f ) is focal. When both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them's expected payment in
The non-negativity of MI f implies that agents are willing to participate in the mechanism. Like Theorem 4.3, in order to show Theorem 5.2, we need to first introduce a lemma which is very similar to Lemma 4.1. 
). The maximum is MI f (X A ; X B ).
The proofs of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.2 are very similar with Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.3. We defer the formal proofs to the full version.
Single-task: strictly truthful forecast elicitation without verification
This section introduces the strictly truthful mechanism in the single-task setting. If we know the realization y of Y , we can simply apply a proper scoring rule and pay Alice and Bob PS(y,p x A ) and PS(y,p x B ) respectively. Then according to the property of the proper scoring rule, Alice and Bob will honestly report their truthful forecast to maximize their expected payment. However, we do not know the realization of Y . In the information elicitation without verification setting where Alice and Bob are required to report their information, Miller et al. [23] propose the "peer prediction" idea, that is, pays Alice the accuracy of the forecast that predicts Bob's information conditioning Alice's information, i.e., PS x B , (Pr[X B = x B |x A ]) y wherex A andx B are Alice and Bob's reported information. We note the peer prediction mechanism in Miller et al. [23] is truthful. With a similar "peer prediction" idea, we propose a strictly truthful mechanism in forecast elicitation.
Common ground mechanism. Given the prior distribution over Y , Report Alice and Bob are required to report p x A , p x B . We denote their actual reports byp x A andp x B . Payment Both Alice and Bob are paid Theorem 5.4. With the conditional independence assumption (and when the prior is stable), given the prior distribution over the Y , the common ground mechanism is (strictly) truthful; moreover, when both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them's expected payment in the common ground mechanism is the Shannon mutual information between their private information I (X A ; X B ) = MI K L (X A ; X B ).
The (strictly) truthful property of the common ground mechanism is proved by the fact that log scoring rule LSR is strictly proper. We defer the proof to the full version.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We build a natural connection between mechanism design and machine learning by addressing two related problems: (1) co-training: learning to forecast ground truth using two conditionally independent sources, without access to labeled data; (2) forecast elicitation: eliciting high quality forecasts from the crowds without verification, by the same information theoretic approach.
For the co-training problem, as usual in the related literature, we reduce the problem to an optimization problem and do not investigate the computation complexity or the data requirements.
To implement our f -mutual information gain framework in practice, we implicitly assume that for high dimensional X A , X B , there exists a trainable set of hypotheses (e.g. neural networks) that is sufficiently rich to contain the Bayesian posterior predictor but not everything to cause over-fitting. The most apparent empirical direction will be running experiments on real data by training two neural networks to test our algorithms. Interesting theoretic directions include the analysis of the Bayesian risk and the influence of the choice of the convex function f on the convergence rate.
For forecast elicitation, the most apparent direction will be performing real-world experiments. To apply our mechanisms, we do not need that every two agents' information is conditionally independent. In fact, for each agent, we only need to find a single reference agent for her such that the reference agent's information is conditionally independent of hers. Then we can run our mechanisms on the agent and her reference agent. In practice, we can pair the agents with some side information and make sure each pair of agents' information is conditionally independent.
Another interesting direction is to ensure fairness, in particular, that agents are not incentivized to coordinate on stereotypes. One solution, is suppressing information from some of the agents and using our framework. However, when this is not possible, the prior peer prediction work on cheap signals [12, 18] may be helpful in addressing this issue.
